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IN THE MATTER OF FREEPORT ITALIAN BAKERY,
INC.: DISAPPROVING AND REMOVING TRUSTEES
IN BANKRUPTCY
In In the Matter of Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc.' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently removed
a creditor-elected trustee in bankruptcy who was a close relative of
the bankrupt corporation's shareholders and creditors because he
had not fulfilled his duty as trustee to press all legitimate claims
of the estate.2 Although the general rule is that a trustee may be
disapproved or removed on a showing of cause,3 the courts4 have
restrained from disapproving trustees elected by the creditors 5 and
removing approved trustees.6 This Note will analyze Freeport Bak-
ery in view of the hesitancy of courts to disapprove or remove
trustees, assaying the prevalent factors necessary before a court will
disqualify the creditors' choice for trustee or remove an appointed
trustee.
A incorporated his small wholesale bakery, beginning opera-
tions in February, 1956. It was soon apparent that more capital
was needed to finance equipment purchases. A solicited loans from
his brother, B and from B's son-in-law, C. C testified that he and
B advanced some $17,000 between February and December 1956.
This parol evidence was supplemented by cancelled cheCks drawn
by B and C and endorsed by A. B died in 1957. In 1958 a series of
notes payable to C and B's widow were prepared and signed
by A as president of the corporation and in his own name. In 1959
a second series of notes containing the same terms were signed by a
new president of the corporation and checks were issued in payment
of the notes. These checks, however, were returned for "insuffi-
cient funds." C and B's widow then brought suit on the notes
against A and the corporation. They obtained a default judgment
only against A because the corporation had not been served with
process. While a second action against the corporation was pending,
they filed a petition for involuntary bankruptcy. Thereafter de-
fault judgments were rendered against the bankrupt corporation.
In the bankruptcy proceedings C voted his claims for himself and
was elected trustee. As trustee he made no effort to assert a claim
1. 340 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1965).
2. Id. at 54-55.
3. See Bankruptcy Act § 2a (17), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11
(1964).
4. Court is defined as "the judge or the referee of the court of bank-
ruptcy in which the proceedings are pending." Bankruptcy Act § 1(9),
52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1964).
5. E.g., In the Matter of G. E. C. Securities, Inc., 331 F.2d 655 (2d
Cir. 1964).
6. E.g., In re Paramojnt-Publix Corp., 68 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1934).
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against A as co-maker of the first series of notes. A general creditor
sought to remove C as trustee on the grounds of improper election,
for making false and fraudulent claims against the bankrupt cor-
poration in his capacity as creditor, and for failing to prosecute the
claims of the corporation to its detriment. The referee denied
relief and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed
the order and directed the appointment of some person having no
previous connection with any of the parties in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.7
Section 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 8 provides for the election of a
trustee by creditors at their first meeting after the adjudication,
after a vacancy has occurred, or after an estate has been reopened.9
Before a trustee can be validly elected he must receive a "majority
vote in number and amount of claims of all creditors whose claims
have been allowed and who are present." 10 It must be noted, how-
ever, that such an election is not absolute. Every election is con-
tingent on approval from the court. Section 2a (17) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides that courts of bankruptcy" are invested with
power to exercise original jurisdiction to "approve the appointment
of trustees by creditors or appoint trustees when creditors fail so
to do.'
12
The primary concern of sections 44a and 2a(17), however, is to
vest the right of appointment in the creditors.'3 Hence, the power
of the court to disapprove is necessarily contingent on a showing of
cause. 1 4 Proper cause for disapproval exists only when it clearly
appears that a fair and efficient administration of the bankrupt
7. 340 F.2d at 55.
8. 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 72 (1964).
9. See In re Nice & Schreiber, 123 Fed. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1903), wherein
the court aptly notes that the "creditors have the right to administer what
is practically their own property by a proper trustee of their choosing."
Id. at 988.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 56, 52 Stat. 865 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 92 (1943).
11. "'Courts of bankruptcy' shall include the United States district
courts and the district courts of the Territories and possessions to which
this Act is or may hereafter be applicable." Bankruptcy Act § 1(10), 11
U.S.C. § 1(10) (1964).
12. Bankruptcy Ace § 2a(17), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § lla(17)
(1964). See In the Matter of Eloise Curtis, Inc., 326 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1964). Before the Amendatory Act, 52 Stat. 840-74 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§
1-114 (1964), the creditors had an unqualified right to appoint their own
trustee. See In re Lewensohn, 98 Fed. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 104 Fed.
1006 (2d Cir. 1900). To offset unscrupulous elections the Supreme Court
wisely promulated General Order XIII, which provided that the appoint-
ment of trustees was subject to the approval of the court. General Order
XIII was abrogated as superfluous after the adoption of Section 2a(17) of
the Bankruptcy Act.
13. See, e.g., In the Matter of Eloise Curtis, Inc., 326 F.2d 698, 700 (2d
Cir. 1964).




estate would be imperiled. 15 Such a determination rests largely
within the sound discretion of the court. 16
The Bankruptcy Act does not prescribe any standards for
judging a trustee's competence.1 7 The presence of certain factors,
however, will result in the disapproval of one elected by the credi-
tors. Trustees elected by undue activity on their own behalf", or by
undue activity of the bankrupt 19 and those enjoying certain "preju-
dicial associations '20 with the creditors 21 or the bankrupt2 2 have
been subjected to close judicial scrutiny before receiving approval.
In re N.S. Dalsimer & Co.23 typifies the view that a candidate
for trustee will be disqualified if his election resulted from his ac-
tive solicitation of creditors for proxies. The trustee was elected
by a majority in number and amount of the creditors participating.
Substantially all of the votes for him were cast under powers of
attorney held by him. In disapproving the creditors' choice, the
district court noted that a "trustee should be wholly free from all
entangling alliances or associations that might in any way control
his complete independent responsibility. '24  Dalsimer was appar-
ently overruled the following year by In re Mayflower Hat Co.
2 5
Under facts similar to Dalsimer, the Mayflower court reasoned that
since creditors were permitted to vote for themselves as trustees,
their proxy could not be disqualified from a trusteeship merely be-
cause he voted the proxies for himself.
26
Sufficient ground for disapproving the creditors' selection ex-
ists when it can be shown that activities by the bankrupt influenced
15. See In re Bay Parkway Haberdashers & Hatters, Inc., 69 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1934); In re Mayflower Hat Co., 65 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1933); In re
Blue Ridge Packing Co., 125 Fed. 619 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
16. E.g., In the Matter of Eloise Curtis, Inc., 326 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1964); In re Thomas, 263 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1959); In re Bay Parkway
Haberdashers & Hatters, Inc., supra note 15; In re Mayflower Hat Co.,
supra note 15.
17. See Bankruptcy Act § 45, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 73
(1964), wherein it is provide that "receivers and trustees shall be ...
individuals who are competent to perform their duties and who reside or
have an office in the judicial district within which they are appointed .. "
18. See generally 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 44.10 (14th ed. 1964).
19. See COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 44.09.
20. This term was apparently coined in Note, Disqualification of
Trustee in Bankruptcy for Prejudicial Associations, 42 YALE L.J. 1187
(1934).
21. See generally COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 44.08.
22. See Casenote, Disqualification of Trustee in Bankruptcy Due to
His Prior Role as Assignee for the Benefit of Creditors Should Be Based
on Discretion, 9 UTAH L. REV. 477 (1964); see generally COLLIER, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 44.07.
23. 56 F.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
24. Id. at 646, quoting from In re Rekersdres, 108 Fed. 206, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1901). See also In re Lurie Bros., Inc., 267 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.
1959).
25. 65 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1933).
26. Id. at 331.
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the election. In re Bloomberg2 7 is illustrative. The bankrupt's
father furnished one creditor with a list of all of the bankrupt's
creditors and assisted that creditor in soliciting powers of attorney.
The creditor voted all the proxies he received, which amounted to
a majority in number and amount, for the trustee who was subse-
quently approved by the referee. The court reversed the referee's
approval holding that since the trustee represented the creditors,
and not the bankrupt, it was improper for the bankrupt to actively
interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the creditors' right to
elect.
28
The creditors' selection for trustee will also be disapproved if
the trustee's relationship with one or more of the creditors is
deemed prejudicial to the administration of the bankrupt's estate.
In re Scott 29 applied this principle. The elected trustee was an
employee of a credit association which represented creditors of the
bankrupt. The fees earned by the trustee went to the association
under a prior agreement and compensation to the trustee-employee
was fixed by the association. The court noted that a conflict of in-
terest could arise between the general class of creditors and those
creditors represented by the trustee's employer-association. 0 The
trustee was therefore disapproved.
A prejudicial association between the trustee and the bankrupt
has often resulted in the disapproval of the trustee. In re Wink
3"
held that there is such a strong presumption against the approval
of the bankrupt's attorney that it is doubtful whether such a
choice should ever be confirmed. The court aptly noted:
It is inexpedient that the former attorney for the bankrupt
shall become his trustee. There are many and cogent rea-
sons for so holding. One of the most obvious of these is the
always existing possibility that it may become the duty of
the trustee to take legal proceedings of some kind against
the bankrupt. If it does, the difficulties and embarrassment
which may result from recent confidential relations be-
tween the two may be of the most serious character. More-
over, for the harmonious, and therefore economical, admin-
istration of the bankrupt's estate, it is desirable, if possible
that the trustee shall . . . have the confidence of the credi-
tors generally and that his motives shall not be distrusted
by even a minority of them. Such confidence is not likely
to be given to one who was the adviser of the bankrupt in
the commission of the act of bankruptcy. 32
27. 48 F.2d 635 (D. Minn. 1931).
28. Id. at 637. See Sloan's Furriers, Inc. v. Bradley, 146 F.2d 757
(1945); In re Lloyd, 148 Fed. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1906); In re McGill, 106 Fed.
57 (6th Cir. 1901); cf. In the Matter of Nat'l Discount Corp., 196 F. Supp.
766, 767-68 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
29. 53 F.2d 89 (W.D. Mich. 1931).
30. Id. at 90-91.
31. 206 Fed. 348 (D. Md. 1913).
32. Id. at 349-50.
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There is, however, conflict among the courts on the application
of the prejudicial association factor to assignees for the benefit of
the creditors. In Garrison v. Pilliod Cabinet Co.3 3 the court held
that the selection of an assignee as trustee was presumably im-
proper. As an assignee, the party must account to the estate. As a
trustee the party is required to investigate the assignee's account.
The assignee-turned-trustee must, therefore, investigate his own
account. 34 The Garrison court had no problem in disapproving the
trustee. More recently, however, the second circuit In the Matter of
Eloise Curtis, Inc.3 5 applied a different approach. In reversing the
district court's disapproval of an assignee elected trustee, the court
remanded the case with instructions to the referee to determine the
trustee's election as an issue of discretion, rather than an issue of
lawA6  In Garrison the presumption against the propriety of the
trustee's selection was not overcome. The Eloise Curtis court sug-
gests that the presumption can be overcome by showing that the
assignee is well qualified to act disinterestedly as the trustee. In
fact, his selection may be warranted on the basis of the advantages
received from the continuity in administration."7 Hence, a referee
should exercise his discretion in light of the circumstances of each
case.
3 8
A prejudicial association with the bankrupt would appear to
exist in those cases in which a relative or shareholder of the bank-
rupt is elected trustee. To offset the possibility of their election
to trusteeship, the Bankruptcy Act forbids relatives of an individual
bankrupt, and shareholders, officers and directors of a bankrupt cor-
poration from voting at an election for trustee.8 9 It would seem that
a prejudicial association existed in Freeport Bakery. The elected
trustee, who had voted claims for himself, was a close relative
40 of
the corporate shareholders and creditors. The Freeport Bakery
court, however, noted that this factor was not of itself sufficient to
disqualify the relative from being elected trustee or from voting
his claims.4 1 The court drew a nice distinction. The elected trustee
was not a relative of the bankrupt (corporation); he was merely
related to the bankrupt's shareholders and creditors. Moreover,
33. 50 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1931).
34. See In re Kellar, 192 Fed. 830, 833 (1st Cir. 1912); see also In re
Zuky, 18 F.2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. 1926) (dictum).
35. 326 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. Id. at 701. See In re Kutchler, 69 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1934); In re
Blue Ridge Packing Co., 125 Fed. 619 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
37. In the Matter of Eloise Curtis, Inc., 326 F.2d at 700. See Case-
note, Disqualification of Trustee in Bankruptcy Due to His Prior Role as
Assignee for the Benefit of Creditors Should Be Based on Discretion, 9
UTAH L. REV. 477 (1964).
38. See Herzog, The Election of a Trustee, 34 REF. J. 73 (1960).
39. Bankruptcy Act § 44a, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 72a (1964).
Cf. Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1954).
40. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(27), 52 Stat. 840, 11 U.S.C. § 1(27) (1964).
41. 340 F.2d at 54.
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the prejudicial association test is used in those cases in which the
trustee's approval is in question. Freeport Bakery was a removal
action.
42
One might initially suspect that grounds for removal of an
approved trustee are identical to the grounds for disapproval of a
trustee. In practice, however, such is not the case. Once the trustee
has received approval after close scrutiny by the court and has
assumed his position, it is detrimental to the efficient administration
of the estate to remove him, except when sufficient cause warrants
such action. 43  Section 2a (17) of the Bankruptcy Act expressly
provides that courts may "upon complaints of creditors or upon
their own motion, remove for cause receivers or trustees upon hear-
ing after notice.
'44
One specific ground for removal of a trustee appears in Gen-
eral Order 17(3). 45 It provides:
In case the trustee shall neglect to file any report or state-
ment which it is made his duty to file or make by the Act
or by these general orders; within five days after the same
be due, it shall be the duty of the court to make an order
requiring the trustee to show cause . why he should not
be removed from office.
Other grounds for removal are determined by the court's exercise
of sound discretion.46 Since the trustee has been subjected to close
scrutiny before receiving the court's approval, it would appear that
additional circumstances must be present before a court will remove
a trustee.47 Prior circumstances, however, unknown to the credi-
42. Query, if this were an appeal from the referee's approval of the
creditor's election, rather than a removal action, would the case have been
decided on the "prejudicial association" issue? It is suggested that the
court should look at the substance of the issue and not merely the form.
Judge Frank, dissenting in Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir.
1954), recommends that courts "pierce the corporate veil." The fact that
the trustee is related to the bankrupt is practically equivalent to the
trustee's relationship with the bankrupt corporation's shareholders, al-
though a technical distinction is apparent.
43. Cf. In the Matter of Flexible Conveyor Co., 156 F. Supp. 164 (N.D.
Ohio 1957), wherein the court refused to disapprove the appointment of
the trustee made ten months prior because it would serve no useful pur-
pose, notwithstanding their conclusions as to an improper election.
44. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(17), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § lla(17)
(1964).
45. See Bankruptcy Act § 30, 30 Stat. 554 (1898), which empowered
the Supreme Court to prescribe and amend all rules, forms, and orders to
effectuate the provisions of the act. This section has been repealed by 78
Stat. 1001 (1964). The repeal, however, does not invalidate or repeal
rules, forms or orders issued by the Supreme Court prior to October 3,
1964. In the future, such orders will be made by the Supreme Court
pursuant to 78 Stat. 101 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964).
46. E.g., Woodford v. Cosden & Co., 289 Fed. 67 (8th Cir. 1923).
47. E.g., In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 68 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1934)
(former director, present shareholder and intimate friend of officials of
bank being sued by estate); In the Matter of Holden, 258 Fed. 720 (N.D.N.Y.
[Vol. 70
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tor at the time of election, or unknown to the court at the time of
approval, might constitute grounds for removal. In re Oliveri48 pre-
sented such a situation. The trustee was the attorney and officer
of the bankrupt's landlord. The general creditors, unaware of this
fact, had elected him trustee. When this fact was discovered, the
trustee was removed. The court held that there was a possible
conflict of interests between the landlord corporation and the gen-
eral creditors who had adverse interests in the bankrupt's estate.49
More frequently, however, the trustee is removed for factors
arising after his appointment, 50 such as misconduct in office. The
classic illustration is Bollman v. Tobin.51 After the adjudication of
bankruptcy, two creditors led a campaign to elect a trustee who
would initiate action against the bankrupt's father, allegedly a
silent partner in the bankrupt brokerage firm. This faction se-
cured a majority in number and amount of claims to elect a trustee.
After their first selection was disapproved by the referee, the ma-
jority creditors elected another trustee who had been active with
them. Over the objection of the minority creditors, the trustee was
approved. Subsequently the trustee had many conferences with
the bankrupt's father. He took no action to establish the father's
liability, even though the majority creditors had presented a report
indicating the father's partnership. The court removed the trustee,
holding that by his conduct he had lost the confidence and co-opera-
tion of the creditors who had elected him; this impeded the efficient
administration of the estate. 52
1919) (former assignee for benefit of creditors). See generally COLLIER,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 44.19.
48. 45 F. Supp. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
49. See also In re Allied Owners' Corp., 4 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.
1933).
50. E.g., In re Schireson, 45 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (bankrupt's
attorney prepared various papers for the appointed trustee).
51. 239 Fed. 469 (8th Cir. 1917).
52. Id. at 472. Accord, In re Savoia Macaroni Mfg. Co., 4 F. Supp.
626 (E.D.N.Y. 1933), wherein the court noted:
The court should not delay the necessary administration of the
estate in order to determine the ultimate truth of . . . charges, for
that is not the real problem before the court. The problem is to
have a trustee in charge entirely independent of any faction, well
qualified to administer the estate and who will not present ...
constant friction between interests, but, on the contrary, will sat-
isfy ... all the creditors in seeing that the bankrupt estate is well,
expeditious, and duly administered.
For this reason, and without deciding the trust or falsity of
the various charges made . . . and solely in the interest of har-
mony and the proper and efficient administration of this estate,
this court has granted the motion to remove the present trustee.
Id. at 627. (Emphasis added.) See In re Bloomberg, 48 F.2d 635 (D. Minn.
1931); In re Conemaugh Coal Mining Corp., 18 F.2d 682 (W.D. Pa. 1926)
wherein the court ruled that since the three trustees were not acting
together, the best interests of the estate required its administration by
disinterested trustees.
Prior to 1938 a trustee who employed an attorney who was a legal
NOTES
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In re Stephen & Co. 53 illustrates that a court will remove a
trustee for irregularities even though he was not found to be per-
sonally dishonest. The trustee had taken advances on the com-
pensation he might receive during the administration of the estate.
The referee had apparently approved the withdrawals since he
countersigned the checks from the estate.54 The court held that
this irregularity alone compelled the removal of the trustee, regard-
less of the motive or personal honesty of the trustee. Another
irregularity in the administration of the estate occurred when the
trustee purchased personal property of the bankrupt estate. Al-
though the low pecuniary value of these articles negated dishonesty,
the court noted that to sanction such a transaction would invite dis-
honesty to the detriment of the bankrupt estate.55
Since the trustee represents the creditors, and not the bankrupt,
he should not join with the bankrupt to effect a composition detri-
mental to the creditors. This principle was announced by the In re
Allen B. Wrisley Co.5 6 court:
A trustee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court, chosen by
vote of the creditors. He stands to creditors in a fiduciary
relation. He holds the estate in trust primarily for the cred-
itors, secondarily, if there be surplus, for the benefit of the
bankrupt. . . . His sole care should be to make the most
out of the estate. . . . When he goes beyond that, and
seeks to aid the bankrupt at the expense of the creditors,
and by concealment or by false representation induces cred-
itors to act contrary to their interests, he violates his duty,
and should be removed from the trust.
57
Undue delay by the trustee in initiating suits on behalf of the
estate may constitute a ground for removal. In Zimmerman v.
Farmington Shoe Co.58 the court imposed a duty on courts to see
that the trustee's performance is prompt and efficient with regard
advisor for one of the general creditors could be removed. In re Carlisle
Packing Co., 12 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. Wash. 1935); In re Forestier, 222 Fed. 537
(N.D. Cal. 1915). Today, however, section 44(c) of the Bankruptcy Act,
52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 72c (1964), provides that "an attorney
shall not be disqualified to act as attorney for a receiver or trustee by
reason of his representation of a general creditor."
53. 30 F.2d 725 (S.D. Cal. 1928).
54. See Bankruptcy Act § 58, 52 Stat. 861 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 76(c)
(1964). This section provides that the compensation of trustees for their
services are payable after the services are rendered. The court relied on
an earlier version of this section providing, in essence, the same. See 30
Stat. 557 (1898).
55. Other irregularities allegedly existed: (1) the trustee procured
loans from the estate; (2) he hired the estate's attorney to serve as his
personal attorney; and (3) he demanded rebate from a real estate broker
who had received a commission from the sale of the estate's property.
These acts were held to be inimical and detrimental to the proper admin-
istration of the estate.
56. 133 Fed. 388 (7th Cir. 1904).
57. Id. at 390.
58. 31 F.2d 405 (1st Cir. 1929).
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to distribution of the estate to creditors. If the trustee caused the
delay, he should be removed.59 In Freeport Bakery the trustee
failed to press the legitimate claims of the bankrupt estate. If
mere delay constitutes a ground for removal, the refusal to initiate
actions based on legitimate claims should certainly be regarded as
detrimental to the proper administration of the estate and grounds
for removal.
The language of the court in Fred Reuping Leather Co. v. Fort
Green Nat'l Bank60 seems applicable to Freeport Bakery:
[T] he trustee represents all the creditors and may therefore
be relied upon to press all proper objections to the claims of
those whose standing is questionable. If he defaults in his
duty, the court may . . . direct him in his duty or, if he be
recalcitrant, remove him for disobedience. 61
By analogy the trustee has a duty to press all proper claims on be-
half of the estate. In Freeport Bakery the trustee failed to bring
an action against the former president of the bankrupt corporation
who had been co-signer on a note for which the bankrupt was liable.
An indemnity recovery might have resulted in a substantial gain
to the general creditors. The trustee's failure to initiate such an
action places the burden on another creditor to press the claim.
62
It would appear that, on this factor alone, the Freeport Bakery
decision is correct. 63 It is submitted that Freeport Bakery announ-
ces the proper test to be applied by the court before removing
a trustee:
If the administration of the estate in bankruptcy would suf-
fer more from the discord created by the present trustee
than would be suffered from a change of administration,




59. Id. at 406 (dictum).
60. 102 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1939).
61. Id. at 373 (dictum).
62. Cf. Fred Reuping Leather Co. v. Fort Greene Nat'l Bank, 102 F.2d
372 (3d Cir. 1939).
63. Although it is ordinarily proper for a creditor to be elected trustee,
the additional factor that the Freeport Bakery trustee was a disputed
creditor might have influenced the court in its determination to reverse
the district court and remove the trustee. The prejudicial association
factor could also have been considered by the court.
64. 340 F.2d at 55.
NOTES
